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SEX SELECTION ABORTION AND THE BOOMERANG
EFFECT OF A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE: A PARADOX
OF THE SKEPTICS
LYNNE MARIE KOHM*
Feminism becomes impoverished liberalism if its only
meaning is "anything goes."1
Reproductive alternatives are growing at a profound rate.2
Legal implications abound because the law cannot keep up with
changes in medical technology.3 As society witnesses on a daily
basis what the medical research community has already performed
or discovered, we try desperately to gasp for some ethical air and
comprehend the myriad implications of such research. We think
about moral implications later, and long term social outcomes
rarely, if at all. It is past time for women to think about what
women do to women by disregarding or failing to consider long term
social consequences in light of reproductive alternatives, particu-
larly sex selection abortion.
One of the most useful technologies to couples using artificial
reproduction techniques is "selective pregnancy reduction," a
medical procedure used to reduce a multiple pregnancy, often a
multiple pregnancy induced by in vitro fertilization or drug
therapy.4 Genetic technology and prenatal testing have allowed
* Assistant Professor of Law, Regent University School of Law; J.D. Syracuse
University College of Law, 1988; B.A. Albany University (S.U.N.Y.), 1980. It is with much
appreciation and gratitude that I express my sincerest thanks to the American Center for
Law and Justice for making this project possible. I am very grateful for the priceless work
of Colleen Holmes in research, editing, and discussing these issues. Furthermore, I am
blessed beyond imagination with my own daughter, to whom I dedicate this article.
Kathleen, may you know that "strength and dignity are your clothing," as I have prayed
those virtues on your behalf since we found out you were a girl. May you, therefore, as a
woman, be able to 'laugh at the days to come." Proverbs 31:25.
1. April L. Cherry, A Feminist Understanding of Sex-Selective Abortion:" Solely a Matter
of Choice, 10 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 161, 216 (1995).
2. See MARTINE ROTHBLATT, UNZIPPED GENES: TAKING CHARGE OF BABY-MAKING IN THE
NEW MILLENNIUM 11-13 (1997).
3. See Kathleen A. Miller & Lynne Marie Kohm, Designer Babies: Are Test Tubes and
Microbes Replacing Romance?: Relevant Legal Issues and DNA, 16 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. &
PATHOLOGY 3 (1995).
4. Elizabeth Villiers Gemmette, Selective Pregnancy Reduction: Medical Attitudes, Legal
Implications, and a Viable Alternative, 16 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 383 (1991). Gemmette
discusses the irony of this sort of abortion. Pregnancy reduction abortion is generally
performed because too many pregnancies have resulted from fertility therapy. A woman may
want one child, but have achieved several pregnancies. These multiple pregnancies
endanger each other, thus causing the need for elimination of all but one, which can only be
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parents to choose numerous qualities and characteristics of their
children, even to the point of "designing" their babies. 'We are now
entering an era in which technology has advanced to meet desire so
that sex preferences may be realized through means that promise
a technological utopia for sexist societies."6 Sex selection technology
can be achieved in numerous forms,7 however, this article will focus
on the choice of abortion to plan the gender of a child. Sex selection
achieved by abortion. The irony is that this mother desperately wanted to conceive a child,
and now she has to choose which pregnancy is most wanted, and discard those of the surplus
of "wanted" pregnancies. Gemmette suggests the fallacy of reasoning that abortion is
performed only for "unwanted" babies, causing multiple pregnancy reduction to breakdown
the abortion analysis. See id. This article will further discuss the implications for sex
selection in such a context.
5. See Miller & Kohm, supra note 3, at 1; see also generally ROTHBLATT, supra note 2
(discussing reproductive technology and genetic research and their potential for good and
harm). Genetic engineering is largely beyond the scope of this article, however, the matter
is certainly noteworthy as it presents challenges to our traditional concepts of morality in
reproduction. Since 1958 when Watson and Crick transformed biology by their work with
DNA, "we have been racing toward a seemingly irreconcilable clash between medical
technology and legal ethics." Id. at 1. A New York colleague of mine stated it this way:
Genetics has thus been the source of an enormously dangerous temptation: to
use genetic knowledge to improve on human nature, to give us more choice
about our human traits, and to get rid of genetically based disease ... or the
people with disease .... In the eyes of its most enthusiastic supporters, genetic
knowledge and application are expected to become the greatest of all scientific
breakthroughs in the history of medicine. We will, finally, understand the
deepest biological basis of illness and disease. Even those who are something
less than true believers are impressed with the possibilities, for both good and
ill.
Daniel Callahan, The Genetic Revolution, 66 N.Y. ST. B.J. 30, 30-31 (1994).
6. Jodi Danis, Sexism and "The Superfluous Female" Arguments for Regulating Pre-
Implantation Sex Selection, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 219, 220 (1995).
7. Local libraries and bookstores abound with books that offer "homemade" techniques
for achieving the desired sex of a future child before conception, but after conception there
are only a few ways to determine the sex of a fetus. During the performance of a routine
ultrasound scan, the technician can often offer an educated guess as to the sex of the baby
without guaranteeing results. Much more accurately, there are two procedures for
identifying the sex of the fetus. During the first trimester of a woman's pregnancy, chorionic
villi sampling is used. In this procedure fetal cells are obtained from a suction tube inserted
through the cervix, and the DNA of the cells is examined for fetal sex determination. See
Betty B. Hoskins & Helen Bequaert Holmes, Technology and Prenatal Femicide, in TEST
TUBE WOMEN: WHAT FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD? 237, 238-39 (Rita Arditti et al. eds., 1989).
Amniocentesis is the most popular technique, however, and amniotic fluid is obtained in the
second trimester of pregnancy to provide genetic information of the fetus. See Frances E.
Kobrin & Robert G. Porter, Jr., Sex Selection Through Amniocentesis and Selective Abortion,
in SEX SELECTION OF CHILDREN 47 (Neil G. Bennett ed., 1983). The latter procedure is
generally used to diagnose chromosomal or metabolic abnormalities, sex-linked diseases, or
neural tube defects. Id.
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abortion, or sex preselection as it may also be labeled,8 is rapidly
becoming an acceptable family planning alternative for Americans.
Most sociological polling research on birth order preference
strongly suggests that because males are preferred as first borns,
female babies will be the first to be reduced.9 Indeed, this has
already occurred in many Asian nations.' ° Sex selection abortion
and female infanticide are widely known to be the most utilized
method of family planning in India, China, and many other Asian
countries. In these countries, sex selection abortion contributes to
an already unbalanced sex ratio occasioned by neglect of female
children." "Due to inadequate care afforded to female children and
to women, an estimated sixty million to one hundred million women
are 'missing' from the world's population, including twenty-nine
million in China and twenty-three million in India."'2
It could be easily chronicled that women are not gaining respect
and power by increasing their numbers, and yet this article seeks
to show that neither is it an evil patriarchy that is inhibiting
women from conception to birth. Rather, the culpability lies with
biologically-adult women in a pop-culture that values abortion on
demand for any reason, even if that reason be that an unborn
woman is "unwanted."
8. Journalists may use the term "gender selection," but feminists will likely prefer the
use of "gender" to refer to a social construct, while using the word "sex" to connote biological
traits. Danis suggests that "people who wish to sex select children may really be seeking a
child who has characteristics that stereotypically belong to a particular sex, so the term
'gender selection' might more accurately describe the psychological and social desire to select
a child's sex." Danis, supra note 6, at 220 n.4.
9. See MARY A. WARREN, GENDERCIDE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF SEX SELECTION 13 (1985).
10. See Amartya Sen, More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec.
20, 1991, at 61, 61-66.
11. See id. Male children are preferred for agrarian work, societal status and legal
purposes, while the implications of a dearth of women in such societies could very well be
female sex-slavery, wife-selling, rampant prostitution, and rampant male deviancy, as
suggested by Sen. Already, the lack of women is evident in the small villages - there are
very few girls in the school classroom. See id.
12. Dorothy C. Wertz, International Perspectives on Ethics And Human Genetics, 27
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1411, 1432 (1993) (citing Sen, supra note 10, at 61-66). On a tangential,
yet relevant note, it is likely no coincidence that Chinese women suffer the highest suicide
rate in the world,
China leads the world in the oppression of women, forcing these women to undergo
abortions if they violate the one-child-per-family policy and often requiring them to submit
to sterilization or to the insertion of intra-uterine devices (IUDs). Communist Party
population workers chart the menstrual cycles of millions of Chinese women in the
workplace. Tragically, girl babies are frequently killed at birth and orphaned little girls are
left to starve to death. According to a recent article in the London Times, Chinese women
suffer the world's highest suicide rate.. See China/MFN: Which Side Are You On?,
WASHINGTON WATCH, Apr. 18, 1997, at 1.
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Given the well-documented societal preference for male children
- and the fact that millions of women, as well as men, in the
western world, not just third world countries, still react to the
births of daughters with disappointment, sorrow, and even
economic and social penalties - the potential widespread
commercial availability of sex preselection techniques opens up
ominous possibilities.13
A critical account of the feminist plank of abortion on demand's
boomerang effect has only recently been popularly advanced, 14 and
not yet fully exposed in the national legal conversation. The goal of
this project is to illuminate the backlash against the female gender
inherent in the alternative of sex selection abortion, proving the
disempowerment of pro-choice rhetoric and the disadvantage that
Roe v. Wade 5 and its progeny present to women in particular, and,
as a result, to American society in general.
Women must bridge the chasm between feminist jurisprudence
on abortion, and the truth of the legal precedent in light of current
technology and culture. Feminists are unlikely to accept this task,
due to obvious intrinsic conflicts. It must be done, nonetheless, by
women. This gap can only be bridged by women who will reveal
and confront the truth of the matter of life and liberty for a woman
and an unborn woman, and the inalienable right, regard and
respect each deserves. Women can (and should) be empowered to
defend women, born and unborn, in the most altruistic and
unselfish model. If feminism truly distrusts the new reproductive
technologies,"6 there is much room for the encouragement, if not
outcry and demand, that all women wisely use their liberty for the
13. Norma J. Winkler, Society's Response to the New Reproductive Technologies: The
Feminist Perspectives, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1043, 1045 (1986) (citing Roberta Steinbacher, Sex
Choice: Survival and Sisterhood 5-6, Paper Presentation Before the Second International
Interdisciplinary Congress on Women, in Gronigen, Netherlands (Apr. 1984) (copy on file
with the Southern California Law Review). Winkler emphasizes that the incredible
possibilities are actually probabilities.
The first artificial womb is bound to be a million-dollar apparatus, tightly
tethered to the laboratory during its first year of development .... There is,
similarly, a broad continuum in terms of the immediacy of social impact of this
new technology: at one end is the unlikely possibility of human-age hybrids,
while at the other end lies the more pressing issue of sex preselection.
Id. at 1044.
14. See generally Cherry, supra note 1; Danis, supra note 6. Cherry and Danis have
begun this conversation with superior scholarship and feminist courage. Unlike these
women, however, I will use the notion of fetal personhood to place the decision to abort based
on sex selection in the context of the community of all women.
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16. See Winkler, supra note 13, at 1047 (stating that feminists also fear that "recent
gains in women's reproductive autonomy may be lost back to the medical establishment").
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good of all women, and therefore society. Women must determine
to take back control, not through insistence upon autonomy via
medical technology, not through anger or United Nations 'legisla-
tion," but by maintaining strength, self-control, and wisdom, free of
self-centered choice.
The present may mark one of those watersheds in which the
interpretation of the basic goal of equality is reconsidered and
in which its meaning for feminism's political and social program
is altered ... prompting feminists to ask whether the move-
ment's current positions on motherhood, choice, and other
issues of primary concern to women remain expressive of the
egalitarian ideal.1 '
This egalitarian ideal rests on something much more formidable
than temporal self interest.
This article will use sex selection abortion to expose the disem-
powerment of the philosophy and rhetoric of choice. Section One
begins with a philosophical framework for gender equality, and the
liberal twist on liberty. Section Two discusses how this frame-work
was the basis for the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and further analyzes the concept of
gendercide' 8 through abortion in light of these constitutional
parameters. The current state of selective pregnancy re-duction
and other opportunities for genetic selection of offspring character-
istics are examined in Section Three, while Section Four discusses
the cultural and medical aspects of reproductive technology and the
subconscious development of gendercide. This will set the stage for
Section Five which will detail sociological studies on sex preference
and birth order among American parents, and related socio-cultural
material. Section Six reviews the case law in the area of abortion
and relevant regulation thereof, and Section Seven confronts the
problem of gender protection due to the lack of regulation of
abortion providers. The conclusion challenges all women in general,
and women's right activists in particular, to cross the invisible
abortion line that may have been drawn in the sand, to act nobly in
17. Id. at 1048 (in a section entitled "Feminist Dilemma Regarding Reproductive
Technology').
18. "Gynocide" or 'femicide" might be more accurate terms when discussing sex selection
abortion in the context of harm to all women, but I have chosen to adapt the gender neutral
term "gendercide" as used by Mary Anne Warren, supra note 9, at 22, for convenience, and
to note the potential use of the expression that women would use the practice to rid a society
of all men, as well. The most accurate phrase for the purposes of this article, however, might
be "self-gendercide."
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favor of women, despite the right or opportunity to choose to
terminate a pregnancy.
Moreover, an important objective of this article is to reach out
to the feminist community with a concern for women as a gender,
from women who are not represented by the feminist movement,
but nonetheless are extremely concerned for women, their welfare,
and for a civilized society where responsible liberty reigns. We, as
women, think we've "come a long way, baby,"19 but in 1997 discrimi-
nation against women remains steadfast. "A sign near the driver's
seat showed an arrow pointing to the rear of the bus and in bold
black letters, the word 'women."'2 ° This time it's not religion that
is harming women, it is other women.
This article will review how women are victimized by other
women's free exercise of self-centered and unlimited personal
liberty. The salient point is that sex selection abortion is illustra-
tive of the fact that abortion in general is destructive to women.
What was once hailed as the choice that would free all women has
come to shackle the future of women as a gender. Every woman can
make a difference, and every woman deserves that opportunity,
even in the face of being sent to the back of the bus, or being forced
out of the womb.
I. PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIBERTY AND EQUALITY AND
THE POWER OF RHETORIC OVER REASON
John Stuart Mill advanced "one very simple principle" in his
emphasis on liberty.21 In that principle, Mill declared,
19. A Virginia Slims cigarette ad jingle sang out "You've come a long way, baby, to get
where you got to today." This is interestingly analogous to the abortion industry. See infra
§ VII. The cigarette industry marketed their products to women appealing to their progress
as a gender, and to their individuality, all the while killing them (see current cases against
the tobacco industry for wrongful death claims) and endangering their potential offspring.
20. In Israel, It's Women to the Back of the Bus, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, July 13, 1997, at A25.
Subtitled, 'The government is formalizing segregation in line with views of deeply observant
Jews," the article explains the decision to segregate the sexes based on religious orthodoxy
in Israel. No mention was made of the value of lack thereof of one sex over the other, but one
cannot help but think about Rosa Parks, in Selma, Alabama, (or Jackie Robinson in the U.S.
Navy) and her refusal to be treated as less of a human because of her color. One has to
wonder if Ms. Parks ever saw her gender as a strike against her too. One Israeli legislator,
Naomi Hazan, was quoted as stating, "Public transportation as a vehicle for inequality is
unacceptable." Id. This is significant because women are still being sent to the back of the
bus at the turn of the twenty-first century. This article will review the current state of dis-
crimination against unborn women, or female fetuses, in light of sex-selection abortion, or
what may be affectionately rather than clinically referred to as gender preference abortion.
21. JOHN STUART MILL, on Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESsAYS 13-14 (John Gray
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1859).
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the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of
their number, is self-protection . . . . The only part of the
conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that
which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns
himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.22
Elsewhere, Mill commended restraining discipline and the subordi-
nation of the aims and impulses of the individual to the ends of
society.23 It appears that Mill either contradicted himself, or
realized the dilemma of his one simple principle.24 A third possibil-
ity is that he assumed an inherent mutual reciprocity of rights and
responsibilities in the context of a civilized society. The rule itself
says very little about standards of conduct, and what happens when
one individual's ideas conflict with another's. Furthermore, it
ignores the necessity of responsible others in preserving that right
for any one. The mutual reciprocity is either implicit or assumed,
otherwise the rule is impossible.25
Liberty is based in this principle of reciprocity and in the notion
that the inherent equality of all members of a society demands that
all members equally enjoy that liberty. Thus, each individual who
enjoys liberty must protect the liberty of the others. With every
right, there is a corresponding duty.26
I have primarily chosen to pursue enlightenment philosophers as their work formed the
basis for the American concept of liberty. Although other forms of philosophy and theories
of feminism may also be appropriate to oppose sex selection abortion, they are dealt with
elsewhere. See Cherry, supra note 1, at 175-87. Specifically, this article seeks to point out
the liberty interests promoted by the skeptics, and how they viewed their own ideas with
uncertainty at times.
22. Id. at 14.
23. See GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ON LIBERTY AND LIBERALISM: THE CASE OF JOHN
STUART MILL 77-78 (1994).
24. See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH 59 (1996) (declaring that Mill's
principle is "both impossible and empty").
25. See id. at 59-60. Bork states that the principle is impossible "because the complex
relations of the individual and his society cannot be reduced to a single rule .... [A]ll of
human history shows that is not the way any real society has ever operated." Id.
26. Martha Minow illuminates this point in Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert
Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860 (1987). Likewise, Katherine Bartlett agrees that responsibilities
are spoken of far too infrequently for the amount of "rights talk" offered in her article Re-
Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 301-302 (1988). Minow writes:
The use of rights discourse affirms community, but it affirms a particular kind
of community: a community dedicated to invigorating words with power to
restrain, so that even the powerless can appeal to those words. It is a
community that acknowledges and admits historic uses of power to exclude,
deny, and silence - and commits itself to enabling suppressed points of view to
be heard, to make covert conflict overt. Committed to making available a
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There is a popular notion that expanding the sphere of liberty
is always a net gain. That is, quite obviously, wrong. If it were
true, our ultimate goal should be the elimination of all law and
all the restraints imposed by social disapproval. That condition
of moral anarchy seems to be one we are constantly approach-
ing but can never finally reach.27
Mill's concept of liberty "points to a radical disjunction between
the individual and society - indeed, an adversarial relationship."2
Some of Mill's other works indicate that he acclaimed this logic.29
The problem inherent in unrestrained liberty, and its natural end,
liberalism, is that it results in a continual cycle.3 ° We will witness
that cycle with sex-selection abortion. T.S. Eliot noted nearly fifty
years ago: 'That Liberalism may be a tendency towards something
very different from itself, is a possibility in its nature .... It is a
movement not so much defined by its end, as by its starting point;
away from, rather than towards, something definite."'"
Utilitarian in its motivation, sex-selection pregnancy reduction
is designed to reduce the number of pregnancies, thereby reducing
the number of children, while providing the parents with the
children they desire. Parents can determine which gender child
would be "best" for their family. Best can mean most wanted, most
useful, or best fitted into the already-established family, but are
these functional formulas appropriate?
rhetoric of rights where it has not been heard before, this community uses
rights rhetoric to make conflict audible and unavoidable, even if limited to
words, or to certain forms of words. If there is conflict experienced in the
introduction of rights rhetoric to a new area, it is over this issue: Should the
normative commitment to restrain power with communal dedication reach this
new area? The power in question may be public or private.
Minow, supra at 1881-82 (citations omitted). It is notable that Professor Minow follows this
paragraph with a section entitled, "Rights Do Not Presuppose Autonomy. " Id. at 1882.
27. BORK, supra note 24, at 60.
28. GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ON LOOKING INTO THE ABYSS 103 (1993); see also
HIMMELFARB, supra note 23, at 77-78.
29. Although these writings have served as some of the foundations of classical liberalism
(and now radical or neo-liberalism), they nonetheless offer some evidence of Mill's clear
advocacy of responsibilities to support rights. See generally, JOHN STUART MILL,
Utilitarianism, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 129-201 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1991) (1859).
30. Bork discusses the dilemma of unrestrained liberty and it being the core of the liberal
agenda: 'The idea of liberty has continuous change built into it, precisely because it is hostile
to constraints. Men seek the removal of the constraint nearest them. But when that one
falls, men are brought against the next constraint, which is now felt to be equally irksome."
BORK, supra note 24, at 61.
31. T.S. ELIOT, CHRISTIANITY AND CULTURE: THE IDEA OF A CHRISTIAN SOCIETY & NOTES
TOWARDS THE DEFINITION OF CULTURE 12 (1949).
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The father of utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill, even in the face
of personal liberty, would dispute the utility of sex selection
abortion.
[T]he principle which regulates the existing social relations
between the two sexes - the legal subordination of one sex to
the other - is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hind-
rances to human improvement.., it ought to be replaced by a
principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on
the one side, nor disability on the other.3 2
This subordination of one sex to the other is wrong with adults, and
it is wrong with children. Let us consider a theoretical example of
a sex selection abortion situation. If a woman discovers she is
pregnant and she allows the fetus' gender to determine whether it
is a "wanted child," wanting that child because it is a boy, and
terminating the pregnancy because it is a girl is a direct example of
Mill's concept of a chief hindrance to human improvement, with
some semantic enhancement. A woman's desire to be pregnant
with a particular fetus may often determine what her view is of
that unborn child.
Modern society has frequently assumed a view of unborn
children, nonetheless, as being the property of the woman who
carries it, based on bodily autonomy and personal privacy. 3 Since
the unborn child is part of the mother,34 its fate therefore is subject
32. JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 427 (World's Classics, Oxford Univ.
Press 1912) (1869).
33. See Miller & Kohm, supra note 3, at 2.
34. The traditional feminist view, as advanced by Cherry, supra note 1, at 184, is that
the fetus in abortion has no independent moral status. Because the fetus grows and lives
inside a woman's body, it is the experiences and the lives of women that set the parameters
of the moral inquiry.
While the fetus does not have an independent existence, its life tied to the
woman inside whose body it grows, the fetus' existence has a profound impact
on the lived experience of the woman. Hence, my view of the moral status of
the fetus and the morality of abortion is grounded in the reality of women's
lives which make abortion necessary.
Id. (citing CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 184-94 (1989)).
The funny thing is that when a woman is pregnant, she can communicate with her fetus,
and is encouraged to do so by all. the best obstetricians in all the best baby books. See, e.g.,
PENELOPE LEACH, YOUR BABY AND CHILD (1989), and ARLENE EISENBERG ET AL., WHAT TO
EXPECT WHEN YOU'RE EXPECTING (1991). This communication, however, is not by mental
telepathy, but by touch and sound communicated from one entity, the mother, to the other
entity, the fetus. The fetus responds to the mother's communication, and is very often
successful at communicating back to the mother with a kick in the right direction, a fist
pushed in the opposite direction, etc. This reality would certainly seem to dictate the
separation of, and independent moral status of, the two individuals. For the sake of
consensus and the purposes of this article, however, this reality will not be pursued as much
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to the mother's choice. American law often unwittingly treats
children as their parent's property.35 Some may errantly surmise
that this premise is derived from common law. Blackstone, how-
ever, began his chapter "On the Rights of Persons" with the concept
of life and children.36 "Life is the immediate gift of God, a right in-
herent by nature in every individual; and it begins in contemplation
of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb. 37
Seemingly drawing the life-line with viability,' Blackstone clarifies
in the immediately following paragraph.
An infant in ventre sa mere, or in the mother's womb, is
supposed in law to be born for many purposes. It is capable of
having a legacy, or a surrender of a copyhold estate made to it.
It may have a guardian assigned to it; and it is enabled to have
an estate limited to it's use, and to take afterwards by such
limitation, as if it were then actually born.
39
The assumption of being born is made deliberately. Life is divinely
bestowed, personal liberty is inferred, and personal security is
assumed, or more accurately, taken for granted. The child is
thereby served and protected by civil law, and by ecclesiastic law.
New legal paradigms have emerged, however, with strength not in
liberty or security, but in the name of the "family."
The law's apparent concern for children developed as vast
changes in the scope and meaning of family were effectuated
during the early years of the Industrial Revolution. Focusing on
children as the essential, and most valued, component of family
life served family law well. During a century of great transfor-
mation, the law, consistently presuming to serve the interests
of children (and thus of decency), was able to accommodate
startling changes under the rubric of one essential concern: the
welfare of children and families.
as I might like, as the personal relationship between mother and unborn child is truly a
fascinating one that is not automatically altered in nature or reality when a woman makes
a decision for abortion and determines her unborn baby is a fetus.
35. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nom, Stowe v.
Davis, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
36. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129.
37. Id.
38. Many infer this suggestion of viability, but "stirring" may have varied meanings and
connotations. For example, could stirring mean when a foot kicks the uterine wall, when the
heart begins to beat, or when brain waves are detectable?
39. BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *126 (citations omitted)(seeking to demonstrate the
complete compatibility of natural law principles and civil law code.).
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The law's real concern with children in the past century
and a half, however, has also proved a pretext, a mask for other
concerns. Not only have children often been badly served by
rules centered around the children's interests, but these rules
have consistently concealed other interests, including the
diverse interests of adult society in both preserving and
transforming patterns of traditional family life. Associating
these other interests with images of children and childhood has
protected the underlying interests by suggesting that, in the
association, their proponents also support, or at least acknowl-
edge, a moral order. Children have not been well served by the
same association. As children's interest are proclaimed - even
apparently investigated and analyzed in detail - in case after
case, they are subsumed by larger agendas, often unacknowl-
edged - and almost as often, unrecognized.4 °
Reproductive technology has simply propelled this masking
effect at warp speed. 'With the advent of the new reproductive
technologies, the processes of change accelerated at a rate almost,
if not actually, beyond society's capacity to adapt."'" Courts are
floundering in their attempts to adjudicate reproductive technology
concerns. Children represent tradition, but they also represent all
that is post-modern.42 They are the language of family, and they
are the silence of family. "[J]udicial invocations of the child's inter-
ests mask other concerns more now than ever before"43 and repre-
sent the contradictions inherent in judicial interpretation of repro-
ductive technologies, especially in light of further medical evidence.
Within the genres of feminist legal scholarship there should
indeed be a debate in this area. Feminist theory declares that law
and other disciplines work to keep women oppressed. This could
not be more profoundly demonstrated then in the context of sex-
selection abortion. Within feminist doctrine, however, because
women and men are different only as defined by sexual relation-
ships, it is of no consequence that female fetuses will be discarded
more quickly than male fetuses, because fetuses do not have sexual
relationships, and therefore have no impact on the debate. This
40. Janet L. Dolgin, Suffer the Children: Nostalgia, Contradiction and the New
Reproductive Technologies, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 473, 474 (1996). Professor Dolgin sees the
challenges that new reproductive technology pose to social and biological dimensions of
family and states: "Underlying these varied claims lie other interests which serve adults far
more than children, and which support the correlates of autonomous individuality more than
those of holism and connection." Id. at 503.
41. Id. at 475.
42. See id. at 476.
43. Id. at 475-76.
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thinking keeps women myopically trapped within themselves, and
those who are alive at that moment, and thus oppressed.
Catharine MacKinnon proclaims that feminist jurisprudence is
the analysis of law from the perspective of all women.44 All women,
if truly meant to be all inclusive, ought to mean all women living,
dead, and yet to live, which would include those living in gestation
though not yet born. Therefore, the experiences of all unborn
women, or female fetuses, would necessarily be included in the
experiences of all women, even in MacKinnon's view.
The impulse of extreme liberty, or liberalism, is only to offer
more freedom. In this regard, liberty becomes license. Self, ethos,
or a Freudian "id" replaces any sense of liberty preserved for
another, and self becomes unrestrained, limitless, and hedonistic.
For the concept of liberty to work pragmatically, each individual
who enjoys that liberty must be willing to protect that same liberty
for each other member of the society. Liberty and equality require
either a conflict between individuals and society, or among different
individuals, or a balancing of liberty with restraint and order. Self-
discipline and wisdom were the virtues that once allowed an entire
society to have true liberty.
"[I]f there is no ultimate truth to direct political activity, then
ideas can easily be manipulated for reasons of power .... [A]
democracy without values easily turns into open and thinly
disguised totalitarianism."4 Modern conservatism might now be
recognized as what used to be termed classical liberalism - a
concept that accepts constraints upon total freedom due to a clear
view of reality, and with an understanding of the depravity that is
the natural result of unfettered liberty.
Liberty must have at its core social virtue. The enlightenment
existentialist philosopher David Hume recognized social virtue as
a basic tenet of politics and morals, and phrased this as the
"paradox of the skeptics."46 Personal liberty cannot be secured in
solitary subsistence, but only through a strong connection with a
society that respects and mutually protects that liberty. "As much
as we value our own happiness and welfare, as much must we
applaud the practice of justice and humanity, by which alone the
44. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 21-22 (1987).
45. POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS § 46, at 89 (1991).
46. DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 42 (Charles W.
Hendel ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1957) (1751).
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social confederacy can be maintained, and every man reap the fruits
of mutual protection and assistance."47
Another scholar, philosopher and theologian stated the
dilemma this way: "Everything is permissible for me - but not
everything is beneficial. Everything is permissible for me - but I
will not be mastered by anything."'48 In the face of great freedom
will always come great opportunity - both for benefit and for harm.
The fact that something which we believe, or are led to believe, will
bring us happiness, is allowable or legal is not, in and of itself,
reason to pursue that thing. We must be careful to pursue that
thing for the intrinsic good it carries, with an eye toward the
ramifications our choices will have on all of society.
Laws may indeed be designed to reflect and protect the welfare
of society and its individual members. Laws and rules, however, do
not determine one's behavior. The individual is free to choose how
and when it might be appropriate to exercise her liberty. Therefore,
she must have a foundation beyond legality to make the best, most
authentic, choice.
Feminists base much of their "critique of existing institutions
on the claim that the social context of reproduction has been
disadvantageous to women."49 This thinking leads to a fear that
new developments in reproductive technology will similarly operate
against the interests of women.5 ° Women may still control their
own decisions, as long as they are so empowered to make a choice
from a selection of alternatives. The feminists' fear that any benefit
would likely accrue to men, while costs would accrue to women,5'
may be grounded in something more than battling misogyny. For
nearly a century, the reforms the wbmen's movement has sought in
order to better the lives of women have not had the positive effect
hoped for, from the Married Women's Property Acts and the
detriment of separate property jurisdictions52 to no-fault divorce
47. Id. at 43.
48. I Corinthians 6:12 (New International). The Apostle Paul goes on to note that issues
concerning one's body introduce a whole new set of concerns and issues, and thereafter
admonishes the Corinthians to avoid inappropriate behavior and actions, and to "honor God
with your body." I Corinthians 6:20 (New International).
49. Winkler, supra note 13, at 1043 (meaning that the responsibility of bearing and
raising children is a burden that inhibits development in other areas of a woman's life).
50. See id. This is fueled by the concept that science and medicine are largely a man's
field, and will continue to reflect maleness in the development of new reproductive
technologies.
51. See id.
52. "IThe state legislatures began enacting statutes even before 1850 which had as their
purpose the reduction or elimination of the married woman's disabilities .... But they by
no means succeeded in conferring full legal capacity upon married women." HOMER CLARK,
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and the feminization of poverty. 3 Abortion has likewise contrib-
uted to the harm and suffering endured by women.54
Amid the fierce controversy over abortion today, it is easy to
lose sight of the highly personal nature of the decision to end a
pregnancy... and the enormous emotional impact that decision
can have on the woman who makes it. This emotional denial
represents perhaps the most universal hardship imposed on
women who have abortions today.55
Damage can be done to the feminine gender as a whole when
sex preference selection becomes a valid reason for terminating the
life of another woman, though yet unborn. That tiny woman is a
part of the fraternity and fellowship of all women, even if, as femin-
ist doctrine theorists would argue, only by virtue of her tiny womb
and even tinier ovum, which may be taken from her without her
consent" because she has not had the opportunity to enjoy the liber-
THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 289 (2d ed. 1987). Although women
had the right, thereafter, to acquire property, the Separate (Common Law) Property
Jurisdiction rendered any such rights useless in certain circumstances. New statutes, called
Equitable Distribution, were enacted in the latter part of this century to remedy that. The
Married Women's Property Acts actually backfired on women.
53. See Deborah Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the
Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS
191, 197 and n.18 (Stephen Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990). See generally Colleen
M. Holmes, Till Death or the Least Sign of Unhappiness Do Us Part: Can true Marriage
Exist Under Liberal Divorce Laws? (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); and
Lynne Marie Kohm, The New Paradigm of the Feminine Mystique: The Authentic Woman's
Perspective, 2 LIBERTY LIFE & FAM. J. 259, 259-268 (1996).
No-fault divorce advocates heralded this policy as a social reform that would liberate
women by allowing them to freely escape abusive husbands or dissatisfying marriages, and
make uncontested divorce easier, less expensive and less messy. Feminists and other
scholars who vehemently supported this movement are now reconsidering no-fault divorce.
Rhode and Minow report that, "[r]esearch in the aftermath of no-fault reforms has found
a sharp decline in single women's standard of living following divorce and a rise in men's."
DIVORCE REFORM, supra, at 197. The economics of divorce have also played a role in this
nation's increasing feminization of poverty. "Approximately 70% of all single-parent families
are headed by divorced or separated women and half of all female-headed households are
poor." Id. No fault divorce has detrimentally affected society in general by making marriage
seem more disposable, thus devaluing the institution upon which our society is based.
54. See generally MARK CRUTCHER, LIME 5: EXPLOITED BY CHOICE (1996); DAVID C.
REARDON, ABORTION MALPRACTICE (1993); and VINCENT M. RUE, POSTABORTION TRAUMA:
CONTROVERSY, DIAGNOSIS & DEFENSE (1994), each detailing the physical, psychological,
physiological and personal devastation of abortion on women. See generally Joann Rosenfeld,
Emotional Responses to Therapeutic Abortion, 45 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 137, 137 (1992)
(stating "studies indicate that most women have a sense of relief after abortion, although the
next most common emotional response is guilt').
55. ANGELA BONAVOGLIA, THE CHOICES WE MADE at xxv-xxvi (1990).
56. Charles Rice, Natural Law/Family Law: A Constitutional Analysis, Address Before
the Conference on Life, Regent University (July 16, 1994) (outline on fie with author).
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ty of being born: Another woman has deprived her of that freedom
of choice. We have heard of black-on-black violence and brutality
of similar nature. Sex selection abortion is woman-on-woman
violence. If women are truly the less favored gender, and sex
selection abortion continues to be an opportunity for choice, the
aborting of more female fetuses will be a likely outcome, and such
at the hands of other women who could choose differently. Any
capacity that sex preference abortion may have to free any individ-
ual woman will only serve to continue the oppression of women as
a class.
As Americans, we find much of our liberty in "the pursuit of
happiness."57 This happiness, or liberty, is encased in a civilized
society that offers mutual respect for one another based in those
self-evident truths, that "all men are created equal.""8 Mill wrote,
"liberty consists in doing what one desires."59 From this declaration
one could think Mill was either a rebel or a reprobate 60 rather than
a proponent of equality, but he was neither. Clearly he intended
liberty to proceed and operate in a context, not a vacuum. That
context for Mill would appear to be one in which individuals are
viewed as intrinsically equal. Throughout the transformation of
liberalism, however, his philosophical concepts have been trans-
formed to mere rhetoric, encouraging those after him who would
seek opportunity for rebellion, depravity, or both.
Edmund Burke articulated a response to Mill, which serves as
a clarification, when he stated, '"The only liberty I mean is a liberty
connected with order; that not only exists along with order and
virtue, but which cannot exist at all without them. 61 In order to
preserve liberty, it must be balanced by the moral principles of
restraint and order, achieving equality for all members.
II. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS GROUNDED IN
LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
The due process and equal protection liberty interest is derived
from the constitutional concept that all citizens should be treated
57. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
58. Id.
59. MILL, supra note 21, at 107.
60. See BORK, supra note 24, at 60-61.
61. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE AND ON THE
PROCEEDINGS IN CERTAIN SOCIETIES IN LONDON RELATIVE TO THAT EVENT 66 (Conor C.
O'Brien ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1790). Burke seemed to have an understanding of the
nature of mankind, whether actively rebellious or passively indifferent; self-centered
nonetheless.
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alike in life circumstances, equally protected in similar situations,
and that no person should be deprived of that liberty without fair
notice and hearing of the government's intent to invade that liberty.
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees these citizens' liberty of
equal protection and due process. Liberty for all requires equality
for all who enjoy liberty, and equality for all similarly requires
protection of liberty. Equality does not refer to an inherent- quality,
but rather an inherent like treatment of each of the members.
Literal equality is an impossibility, as every individual is unique
and different from another. Equal yet different, all remain equally
valued, equally afforded liberty.62
The rise of legal formalism occurred by the twentieth-century
when the law, which was "once conceived of as protective, regula-
tive ... and, above all, a paramount expression of the moral sense
of the community, had come to be thought of as facilitative of
individual desires and as simply reflective of the existing organiza-
tion of economic and political power."6  Concepts of law were
changed as a result. Due process was transformed from a method-
ology that was merely procedural in nature to a concept that was
largely substantive in nature. 4
Positivism emerged as the central force in redefining the origin
of law. Robert Cover writes,
Law was perceived as operative and valid because of human
constituent process and by virtue of valid lawmaking processes
in pursuance of that Constitution. It was the will of men that
gave law its force. But men look to various sources for the
content of their law. And one very important kind of source is
that which declares what is right and just.65
62. This is not to say that equality mandates equalness, or for example, that each should
be entitled to the same employment but that each may have the liberty to apply for that
employment, and liberty is inferred to the employer in hiring. (The EEOC, however, may
disagree with me.) Our culture habitually confuses the freedom to pursue happiness (a job)
with the requirement that each be given happiness (entitled to that job per se).
63. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 253 (1977).
64. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 158 (1992). In the context of Post-Civil War judiciary, Professor
Horwitz explains the conflict between Classical Legal Thought and the Progressive
Transformation in the concept of property. "It was easy to confuse the controversial
expansion of federal judicial power under the Fourteenth Amendment with a supposed
change in constitutional methodology from 'procedural' to 'substantive' due process. That
confusion was largely produced by later critical Progressive historians intent on
deligitimating the Lochner court." Id.
65. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 34
(1975).
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Cover was speaking of slavery, nonetheless, his point is well taken
in the context of gender equality and liberty. Modern liberalism
has done everything in its power to remove the sense of seeking
what is right and just, largely due to the influence of moral
relativism, stemming from the unbridled utilitarian manipulation
of individual liberty. The result is that anything but a relative
sense of liberty and equality are lost from the constitutional
concepts of due process and equal protection. The higher good is
indeed to seek values, priorities, and right attitudes rather than
placement, roles, or gender. We have replaced values of intrinsic
goodness and unwavering priorities with value-free values,
changing roles, and situational desire.
The role of responsibility cannot be underestimated, and that
responsibility undergirds the Fourteenth Amendment. In order for
each individual to enjoy equal protection and due process, it is the
responsibility of each individual to protect those same liberties
attributed to other individuals. Only when each individual's liberty
is upheld by every other individual will liberty ever prevail for a
society. All rights must necessarily have corresponding responsibil-
ities if those rights are to control and be upheld by any civilized
society. Without responsibility, rights amount to nothing.
III. SELECTIVE PREGNANCY REDUCTION AND GENETIC SELECTION
OF OFFSPRING: THE FUTURE IS Now
The concept of sex selection has ancient roots and is contained
in centuries of scientific and non-scientific experimentation. 'The
quest for sex selection technology dates back to ancient times, when
Greek philosophers advised tying off the left testicle prior to
intercourse in order to assure male children."' Wertz and Fletcher
have conducted the most cited and important studies on human
genetics and ethics around the world." It is strongly suggested that
fetal sex selection and selective abortion of male fetuses who are at
66. Danis, supra note 6, at 220 (citing Owen Jones, Sex Selection Regulation Technology
Enabling the Predetermination of a Child's Gender, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (1992) (stating
that "[tihe philosopher Anaxagoras, who lived between 500 and 428 B.C., gave such advice')).
67. See, e.g., Dorothy C. Wertz, The 19-Nation Survey: Genetics and Ethics Around the
World, in ETHICS AND HUMAN GENETICS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 1-79 (Dorothy
C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher eds., 1989); John C. Fletcher & Dorothy C. Wertz, Ethics, Law,
and Medical Genetics: After the Human Genome is Mapped, 39 EMORY L.J. 747, 765-809
(1991); Dorothy C. Wertz, Ethical and Legal Implications of the New Genetics: Issues for
Discussion, 35 SOC. SCI. MED., 495, 495-503 (1992); Dorothy C. Wertz et al., Medical
Geneticists Confront Ethical Dilemmas: Cross-Cultural Comparisons Among 18 Nations, 46
AM. J. HuM. GENETICS 1200, 1200-13 (1990).
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fifty percent or greater for risk of severe medical problems or
genetic disorders are the primary use of sex selection abortion."
On the contrary, "[m]ost sex selection has no relationship to genetic
disorders. It is used solely to permit the parents to choose the sex
they desire."69
A growing demand for fetal tissue may have some bearing on
this debate. Currently, it is the free choice of a woman to make a
fetal tissue donation.7" Also currently, payment may be rendered
in consideration for access to fetal tissue.' There is an underlying
presumption that abortion of the fetus whose tissue is to be utilized
is a given premise, without moral consequence. Professor Robert-
son, however, illuminates this presumption as he has little dilemma
in articulating an ethical analysis in this regard. He states,
Some persons may object that such callous treatment of the
body and fetus devalues the sanctity of human life because it
treats the fetus as a mere means to a selfish end. It is difficult,
however, for them to make this argument without contradicting
a position that is generally in favor of abortion for unwanted
pregnancy. One can just as reasonably argue that abortion to
avoid an unwanted pregnancy also devalues human life because
it treats the fetus as a means to the end of avoiding the burdens
of unwanted pregnancy. If abortion in that case is nonetheless
morally acceptable, abortion to obtain fetal tissue should also be
acceptable. Indeed, one could argue that aborting to obtain
tissue for transplant is the stronger case. Abortion in that case
is not merely for the convenience of the woman who wishes to
avoid pregnancy, but is done to save the life or health of a
family member. If the reasons behind a woman's decision to
undergo an abortion have sumbolic [sic] importance, aborting to
obtain fetal tissue for transplant should rank very high.
This purpose is no more disrespectful of the intrinsic sanc-
tity of human life than is ending an unwanted pregnancy.""
68. See Wertz, supra note 12, at 1430 ("Identification of fetal sex and selective abortion
of male fetuses who are at fifty percent risk may enable the parents to prevent the birth of
a child with severe medical problems. This use of prenatal diagnosis falls within medically
accepted uses of prenatal diagnosis to prevent serious genetic disorders.").
69. Id. Wertz continues with an interesting discussion about the two ethical issues she
sees involved. 'The first is whether families should be able to choose the sex of their
children, and if so, under what conditions. The second is whether abortion is justified as a
means to this end." Id.
70. See John A. Robertson, Abortion to Obtain Fetal Tissue for Transplant, 27 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 1359, 1372 (1993).
71. See id. at 1373 (suggesting that "a ban on payment might also be justified in order
to protect free choice, though such a ban could deny patients who do not have a willing
female relative access to the fetal tissue transplants they need').
72. Id. at 1377-78.
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Robertson's classification, "merely an unwanted pregnancy" 3
appears to be predicated on his own beliefs regarding the funda-
mental right to procreate. He argues that there are only two issues
involving procreative rights, those being "(1) aborting to get fetal
tissue for transplant and (2) conceiving in order to abort to donate
tissue."74  The right not to procreate is a fundamental right
grounded in the personal burden of unwanted reproduction.75 The
Supreme Court has determined that individuals have a fundamen-
tal right not to procreate, and Professor Robertson bases his
argument on this controversial determination. This ignores the
argument that pro-creation has already occurred. Those who
oppose abortion believe abortion terminates life, not that it prevents
life from beginning at all. In other words, procreation has already
occurred. This weakens Robertson's ideological foundation framing
the matter as a right to avoid procreation.7" A portion of Professor
Robertson's research is dedicated to implications of abortion for sex
selection and discloses his inherent concept of moral relativism:
Analysis of this issue, is useful ... because it focuses attention
on the outer limits of the right to abort, namely, on the issue of
when and how reasons for abortion are morally and constitu-
tionally relevant. The most immediate implication of such a
73. Id. at 1359.
74. Id. at 1380.
75. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (discussing the burdens and harms that may
result to women who are forced to carry fetuses to term); and Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588
(Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub no, Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911 (1993) (arguing the right
not to become a father when the marriage to a child's mother has been irretrievably broken).
76. Robertson states, as would most abortion advocates, that "[a]voidance of procreation
is a fundamental right because of the personal burdens of unwanted reproduction."
Robertson, supra note 70, at 1380. Yet he follows the reasoning by asking, what it appears
he believes are, some tough questions.
Should the reasons that reproduction is seen as a burden matter? Is there a
way to evaluate them as being more or less meritorious? Even if there were,
it would appear that aborting to save the life of a family member or loved one
would rank as a sufficient reason for not going forward with pregnancy ....
What about conceiving in order to abort to get tissue for transplant? Women
might claim a fundamental right to conceive as part of a right to procreate or
simply as an aspect of their right to use their body as they wish.
Id.
Robertson suggests that conceiving with the purpose of abortion is not an exercise of the
right to procreate, but solves this dilemma by calling such conduct "a nonreproductive use
of one's reproductive capacity." Id. I submit this is precisely the problem with abortion, and
precisely why a woman would find higher ground in avoiding the action altogether. This
article, however, focuses on one noble reason to avoid abortion - because it will hurt other
women.
110 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 4:91
focus concerns abortions for sex selection .... Most ethicist
commentators in the United States have assumed that such
abortions are undesirable, if not immoral .... However, the
reason for the abortion no more justifies restrictions designed
to protect fetuses in sex selection cases than it does in the case
of designated donations of fetal tissue.""
Concluding that women must be free to abort for any reason, or
for no reason at all, Professor John Robertson relies on a standard
rights analysis and demands that any restriction on the fundamen-
tal right to abortion must necessarily be outweighed by a compel-
ling state interest.78 Heralding women's autonomy and the
limitless right to control their own reproduction is one way a man
might seek to control the impulses of those women. This may, on
the contrary, be Professor Robertson's use of the autonomy and
control argument to advocate his true concern that fetal tissue be
more readily available. Caution may be appropriate here, as such
an argument would provide for the capitalistic concept of tapping
the abortion market for fetal tissue and asking women to oblige.
This is not providing the best for women in any sense, and certainly
not in the face of gender discrimination. We need to be collectively
concerned about gender discrimination, exploitation, and the
intersection of the two, in areas where we may least likely expect
it to exist. That may include women being taken advantage of for
what they can provide through abortion or society's universal
preference for firstborn baby boys instead of firstborn baby girls.
IV. SOCIOLOGICAL CONCERNS REGARDING SEX PREFERENCE AND
BIRTH ORDER
About one-third of the United States' public favors use of pre-
conceptional methods of sex selection.79 Those who approve of
prenatal testing and abortion for the purpose of sex selection are
relatively few, but the percentage drastically increases to a
substantial minority (thirty-eight percent) who "would approve the
use of abortion for sex selection if a couple already had three
children of the same sex, regardless of whether these were boys or
girls."8 °
77. Id. at 1387.
78. See id. at 1388.
79. See Richard D. Dixon & Diane E. Levy, Sex of Children: A Community Analysis of
Preferences and Predetermination Attitudes, 26 Soc. Q. 251, 264 (1985).
80. See Wertz, supra note 12, at 1430 (citing Eleanor Singer, Public Attitudes Toward
Genetic Testing, 35 POPULATION RES. POLY REV. 255, 255 (1991) (discussing more than
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In the Wertz study, questions on sex selection were presented
to doctoral-level geneticists in 1985.81 Of those surveyed, the "U.S.
women were twice as likely as men to say that they would perform
sex selection, usually out of respect for patient autonomy." 2 A pre-
vious 1975 study of 149 clinically-oriented counselors and geneti-
cists revealed that, of those surveyed, fifteen percent would recom-
mend amniocentesis for sex selection in general, and twenty-eight
percent would do so for a couple with one girl who wanted to ensure
the family name would be carried on and desired to have only two
children."s Wertz and Fletcher document "a clear trend toward a
greater willingness to perform prenatal diagnosis for sex selection
in all nations except India and Sweden" in their 1993-94 survey. 4
In giving reasons for acceding to parents' requests, many
geneticists in the 1985 survey said that sex selection was a
logical extension of parents' acknowledged rights to choose the
number, timing, spacing, and genetic health of their children.
These geneticists regarded withholding any service, including
sex selection, as medical paternalism and an infringement on
patient autonomy. Those who would refuse prenatal diagnosis
said that it was a misuse of scarce medical resources designed
to look for serious genetic abnormalities, that sex was not a
disease, or that they disapproved of the abortion of a normal
fetus. Most regarded sex selection as a private matter between
doctor and patient. Few, except for geneticists in India,
mentioned the societal implications of sex selection.
Most requests for sex selection in developed nations are
probably covert, with women requesting prenatal diagnosis on
the basis of anxiety about the health of the fetus. Information
about fetal sex is usually communicated to the parents if they
wish to know, though some clinics do not provide'the informa-
tion unless specifically requested. In effect, sex selection by
prenatal diagnosis is therefore available to most families.8 5
A myriad of arguments in favor of sex selection are advanced
around the world, and many of them are offered as "ethical"
pregnancy reduction goals, but outright abortion of a single pregnancy solely for
undesirability of the gender of the fetus conceived and rapidly developing)).
81. See id. at 1431 (citing Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher, Fatal Knowledge?:
Prenatal Diagnosis and Sex Selection, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May/June 1989, at 21).
82. Id.
83. See F. Clarke Fraser & C. Pressor, Attitudes of Counselors in Relation to Prenatal
Sex-Determination Simply for Choice of Sex, in GENETIC COUNSELING 109, 110 (Herbert A.
Lubs & Felix de la Cruz eds., 1977).
84. Wertz, supra note 12, at 1431.
85. Id.at 1431-32.
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arguments tenacious with concerns regarding quality of life.
Included among these arguments are the following: that sex
selection would enhance the quality of life for a child of the
"wanted" sex; that sex choice would provide a better quality of life
for the family that has the sex balance it desires; that sex choice
would provide a better quality of life for the mother, because she
would undergo fewer births; that undergoing fewer births would
somehow enhance and elevate the mother's status in the family;
and that sex selection would help to limit the general population.86
These arguments are all based on the outcome of happiness being
achieved to a greater degree once the "desired sex balance" within
the family is attained. They proceed with a justification that
children of the less desired sex, or "the 'unwanted' sex, usually
female, would be spared the abuse, neglect, and early death that is
their documented fate in some developing nations."87 Wertz adds
that such a fate may occur to a less obvious extent elsewhere.8
Abuse of the mothers of female children is another argument
sex selection proponents offer.89 The fact remains that in general
every family wants "at least one child of the desired sex, usually a
son."9° This quality of life incantation is alarmingly Epicurean in
nature. 'Parents historically have used sex selection techniques to
86. See WARREN, supra note 9, at 163-174.
87. Wertz, supra note 12, at 1432-33 (citing Ishwar C. Verma & Balbir Singh, Ethics and
Medical Genetics in India, in ETHICS AND HUMAN GENETICS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
250, 259-60 (Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher eds., 1989)).
It seems that in Philosophy 101 every student learns of Descartes' basic logical sequence,
"I think, therefore I am." There is an underlying assumption of the intrinsic value of
existence possessing goodness in and of itself. Inherent within is the assumption that life
is better than no life at all (regardless of quality of life, but that might have passed with the
1980's), as it is good to think, and it is good to exist. The thinking of the 90's often appears
to be that no life is better than a life of abuse, which is an unfortunate surmise in light of the
possibility that circumstances could, at some point or any point, change for the better, at
which time life would certainly be better than no life at all, and could render the premise of
the 90's as inherently flawed. This may depend on one's view of hope.
88. See id. at 1433.
89. See id. 'Women would not be abused by their husbands for not bearing children of
the desired sex." As I was reading this, I couldn't help but empathize: 'You mean, he
wouldn't have her beheaded if she bore him a son?" This type of Elizabethan ignorance is
blatantly ridiculous, as today it is common knowledge (though that doesn't impute such
knowledge to the average male) that the sex of a child is determined by the chromosomal
content of the sperm that fertilizes the ovum.
90. Id. One of the most disturbing arguments is that "couples could limit their family
size and still have a son to support them in their old age, instead of continuing to have
children until they have a son." Id. There are daughters who can do that, too. However,
parents who expect, or deem themselves entitled, to be supported by their children in their
old age should understand that they have a problem even before they consider beginning to
build their family.
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select male offspring, and the birth of male children continues to be
the desired outcome in the majority of sex selection attempts."9'
V. GENDERCIDE, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, AND
RESPONSIBILITY
The Second World Conference on Family Law and the Rights
of Children and Youth took place in June 1997, in San Francisco,
California.92 New reproductive technologies comprised just one of
the workshop sessions.9 Sexual selection was among "the technolo-
gies and practices that raised fundamental questions about our
concept of health and the value and meaning of human life."94 The
essence of the conference was to "focus on the development of
positive initiatives to improve the lives of children."95
Opposition to sex selection through technological means rests
on two basic premises. The first concern is the "potential creation
of a sex-skewed society with devastating consequences for both men
and women."96 The second is "the invidious sex stereotyping and
sex discrimination inherent in virtually every decision to select the
sex of a child."9 One might think that at the end of the twentieth-
century, after all the hard-fought battles of the women's movement,
that American society would be somewhat free of discrimination,
that at the very least women would understand the plight of
91. Danis, supra note 6, at 220. Unlike Danis, I do not buy into the concept that this
quest for male children reflects a societal preference for "maleness" which "has been a form
of social, political, and economic entitlement." Id. Part of the problem being discussed here
is the feminist fixation with male entitlements. Yet when women do nothing to halt a
contribution to that social program, our cries are pure hypocrisy. I submit that many of us,
even women, believe subconsciously that "male" is somehow better than "female." On the
contrary, the genders are mutually dependent, as one has no meaning, and certainly no
existence whatsoever, without relativity to and compatibility with the other. Homo Sapiens
consists of male and female, both inherently holding equal intrinsic value - that is, until
they are robbed of their purity and burdened with a social construct.
92. See Second World Conference on Family Law and the Rights of Children and Youth,
Conference Program, Jan. 1997. The World Congress was held in association with the 1997
Annual Conference of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts.
93. See id. Specifically, New Reproductive Technologies was workshop session 49.
94. Id. at 16.
95. Id. at 1.
96. Danis, supra note 6, at 220.
97. Id. In her article, Danis argues for federal legislation that would ban pre-
implantation sex selection technology and its use, by health care providers. Her proviso is
that any such ban would have to be "consistent with established constitutional norms
protecting reproductive rights." Id. at 221. This is precisely my concern - that if women
insist on hoarding the "norm" of the constitutional right to choose, raising self interests in
reproductive capabilities supremely over social good, our gender will suffer a self-centered
backlash, with no one to blame but ourselves.
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women. If women, however, insist on putting self desire for a child
of a certain sex above common good to all women by aborting female
fetuses, the gender is headed toward destruction. Gendercide may
not be Orwellian fiction in light of human egocentrism characteris-
tic of unconstrained feminism. Mary Anne Warren discusses the
problematic context of sex selection abortion.9" She differentiates
it from the now familiar practice of eugenic abortion and expresses
apprehension at the possibility of responsible use for sex selection
abortion.
The concept of selective pregnancy reduction involves not only
the conflict between the mother's rights and the fetus' rights, but
the additional conflict of the rights of fetus versus fetus.99 "Which
fetuses are to be aborted? May they be chosen based on sex? Is
there an equal protection argument to be made on their behalf?."'00
Should selective abortion be used for purposes other than fetal
reduction, medical advances allow women to learn the gender of
their fetus early enough to abort based on sex. Thus, it is difficult
to limit sex selection abortion when technology allows a woman to
learn the sex of her child, and is free to abort her child for any
reason.
Might it not be even easier to choose the sex of infants if
selective abortion is indicated for other reasons also? ... If the
procedure were being performed solely to select sex, the statute
would be adequate, but if it is indicated for some other reason
98. See WARREN, supra note 9, at 6-12.
99. See Gemmette, supra note 4, at 390. Fetal personhood status is a widely debated
subject. It merits much consideration and discussion, but is, unfortunately, beyond the scope
of this article.
100. Id. Gemmette carries the equal protection analysis with the assumption that the
state may have a compelling interest in protecting the lives of fetuses from conception on,
based on the four dissenters' views as expressed in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
492 U.S. 490 (1989). Gemmette reasons:
As far as selective pregnancy is concerned, the compelling state interest is in
controlling medical technological advances to ensure that they do not create
technological imperative where there is no real medical necessity. It is to
ensure that physicians will not implant more than one or two or three embryos
when the woman would want only one or two or three live babies. It is in trying
to ensure that no one has to make a choice similar to the one dealt with by
George Annas (1987) in his discussion of killing one Siamese twin to save the
other.
Suppose there is no significant difference in the survival potential of the two
twins. Then neither is "designated for death," but one must be chosen to die for
the sake of the other. How is the decision to be made?... The compelling state




also, then abortion is not "sought solely because of the sex of the
unborn child." Might an amendment (to such a prohibitive
statute) be in order if it is ever discovered that sex selection is
an option given to mothers facing the procedure?"' 1
It is conceivable that abortion for sex selection might be
rationalized as a medical necessity under the right circumstances.
'"The use of selective abortion as a possible tool for sex selection
points to the continuing and future dilemmas raised by the use of
the procedure for other than true medical necessities."' 2
In a somewhat radical tone, some are quick to condemn women
for manipulating circumstances to birth boy babies preferentially.
"Women have long used various means, ranging from consuming
the penises of exotic animals to prayer to using modern concoctions
designed to increase alkalinity and decrease acidity in the reproduc-
tive tract, in order to increase the chances of having a male
child.", 1
03
Personal eugenics is a reality that must be considered when
discussing the formulation of ethics and biotechnology of reproduc-
tion and birth. Although preconception sex selection is different in
nature from sex selection abortion, the comparison is relevant for
personal liberty analysis. "Sperm differentiation for sex-determina-
tion purposes is surely a form of personal eugenics. A decision has
clearly been made that a baby of one sex is not as good, or as desir-
able or as perfect as a baby of the other sex - and something gene-
tic is going to be done about it."'0 4 Individuals are often deciding,
based on personal preference, which sex they would prefer to repro-
duce and birth at a given time under given conditions. Case prece-
dent delineating constitutional rights to procreation indicates that
women are largely the decision makers, and often the sole decision
makers. "[T]here are feminists groups that vigorously oppose
sperm differentiation" ' and the concerns it raises in terms of sex
determination. Anti-abortion advocates need to consider bioethical
questions and their related implications. This article is directed
principally to women who have lost their sense of gender altruism;
however, men are not relieved of their responsibility in this area of
reproductive rights and responsibilities. Jodi Danis is correct when
101. Id. at 393 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204(c) (West 1989) (stating that "No
abortion which is sought solely because of the sex of the unborn child shall be deemed a
necessary abortion').
102. Id. at 394.
103. Gary L. Francione, Series Editor's Foreword, in ROTHBLAT, supra note 2, at ix.
104. ROTHBLATT, supra note 2, at 43.
105. Id.
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she argues that men and women together share the responsibility
for discrimination in sex selection,"°6 but it must be added that
universalism is the route to authenticity, particularly in this case.
10 7
Although... I often refer to women selecting the sex of
their children, it must be remembered that women alone should
not shoulder the burden of moral scrutiny and responsibility for
sex selection. When such technology is available, male partners
may often pressure women towards sex selection. In other
cases, the decision to sex select is a joint decision made by a
couple. In either case, the societal pressures and rewards for
having either male children or the "perfectly balanced" family
may contribute to the decision to select one's offspring. Society
as a whole thus must carry the moral, ethical, and legal
burdens that sex selection technology presents.108
But when women, via the constitutional vehicle of privacy,
undermine shared societal concerns with selfish autonomy for the
sake of individual liberty, that liberty is transformed to incongruity
and self-contradiction; thus the paradox. Early feminist opposition
to abortion recognized that abortion itself did not empower women,
but rather allowed male relinquishment of responsibility for
pregnancy."°9 This paradox of the skeptics can only be eliminated
by liberty with boundaries, empowered by the integrity of the
individuals who enjoy that liberty. Allowing female fetuses to be
aborted because they are female perpetuates powerlessness and
subordination. Worst of all, it drags women into perpetuating this
106. See Danis, supra note 6, at 223.
107. See Kohm, supra note 52, at 278-84.
108. Danis, supra note 6, at 223.
109. See Amicus Brief of Feminists for Life at 19-20, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1991) (No. 90-985). One section of the brief reads:
D. Early Feminist Opposition to Abortion Was Joined to Condemnation of Male
Sexual Irresponsibility and Coercion, and the Lack of Economic and Social
Support for Pregnant Women Abandoned by the Fathers of Their Children.
1. The early feminists called for prevention of the circumstances giving rise to
abortion. Their concern of the lives of unborn children did not preclude, but
was interwoven with, a broader concern for women with crisis pregnancies,
children already born, and their mothers ....
2. The early feminists condemned social attitudes, especially sexual double
standards, which contributed to an increasing incidence of abortion.
Id. at 19-20. See also, MARY KRANE DERR, MAN'S INHUMANITY TO WOMAN MAKES COUNTLESS
INFANTS DIE (1991) (detailing the opposition to abortion held by original feminists like Susan
B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Sarah F. Norton, Victoria Woodhull, Dr. Alice Bunker
Stockham, and Tennessee Celeste Claflin). Susan B. Anthony called abortion "the horrible
crime of child murder," in a July 8, 1869 article in her publication Revolution. Id. at 24.
These brave and courageous icons for women and women's rights were not about to let men
off the hook for responsibility in pregnancy.
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misogynistic world view under the guise of "reproductive freedom."
As long as this societal value structure prevails, how can women
ever be seen as valuable members of society?
The elimination of all forms of discrimination against women
must remain a resolute goal without compromise. When
individual women put their own corrupted selfish desires above
truth, however, other relationships naturally dissipate. And
roles shared between the sexes become marred and uncertain. 10
There are some feminist groups who vigorously oppose sex
selection and particularly sperm differentiation.
In the words of Vibhuti Patel, whose Women's Center leads the
fight against demographic engineering in Bombay, India, "For
us, it's the survival of women that's at stake. The social
implications of sex-selection are disastrous. It's a further
degradation of the status of women."'
The problem with post-modern feminism is the myopic
insistence on the concept that reproductive capacities are the only
meaningful differences between men and women, and therefore are
"the barrier to be overcome for full participation in the male world.
Particularly when combined with the feminist emphasis on sexual
'freedom,' abortion becomes a necessary component of the main-
stream feminist vision. Abortion technology makes possible the full
'emancipation' of women.""' 2 Women and men are different and
complimentary in numerous ways, sexuality and reproduction being
a significant difference, but not the lone meaning in the distinctions
between femaleness and maleness. It would be loathsome to
denigrate the beauty of gender differentiation to mere sexuality,
rendering all non-sexual differences between men and women113 as
scorned and despised.
110. Kohm, supra note 53, at 278.
111. ROTHBLATT, supra note 2, at 43-44.
112. David J. Ayers, The Inevitability of Failure: The Assumptions and Implementa-tions
of Modern Feminism, in RECOVERING BIBLICAL MANHOOD AND WOMANHOOD 322, (John Piper
& Wayne Grudem, eds., 1991) (discussing the failures of modern feminism).
113. Such distinctions include ethological and social behavior differences, limbic system
differences, differences in cerebral organization, non-nervous system physiology, sex
differences in stress management, etc. I do not believe that women (and men) are merely
sexual (and reproductive) beings. See generally ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & CAROL NAGY
JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES 349-355 (1974); LAUREL RICHARDSON,
DYNAMICS OF SEX AND GENDER: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1988); ROBERT W. GOY &
BRUCE S. MCEWEN, SEXUAL DIFFERENTIATION OF THE BRAIN 109-11 (1980); and EDWARD 0.
WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY 42-43 (1980).
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Let us invoke the facultative model here for a moment to
discuss the matter of responsibility. Women are capable of making
their own decisions. 'The facilitative model assumes that each
woman - and not the government - is best situated ultimately to
decide how to balance these competing risks and moral consider-
ations. 1 14 A facultative approach would find an opportunity to em-
power a woman to make a "good" choice in the face of social or emo-
tional obstacles. A woman pregnant with a female fetus does not
respond to punishment for her desire to have a son instead of a
daughter, but might be encouraged to choose life for her daughter
if she were given the moral framework for valuing baby girls as
much as she values baby boys. This is about changing the hearts
and minds of women, and changing how women think about them-
selves - encouraging us all to value ourselves and our unborn
daughters as women.
[Tihe previous rounds of the abortion debate in America were
merely echoes of the issue as the nineteenth century defined it:
a debate about the medical profession's right to make life-and-
death decisions. In contrast, the most recent round of the
debate is about something new. By bringing the issue of the
moral status of the embryo to the fore, the new round focuses on
the relative rights of women and embryos. Consequently, the
abortion debate has become a debate about women's contrasting
obligations to themselves and others.115
One might think that gendercide would only be possible in a
sexist society. Yet virtueless autonomy for women may be the key
element in bringing about the annihilation of women if sex selection
abortion is supported by women.1"6 Sex selection abortion is vio-
lence against women, two of them, a mother and a daughter. Cur-
rent case law and related statutes support the right of women to
choose,1 1 7 regardless of the reason.
114. Dawn Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing
Women's Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 575 (1992).
115. KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 193 (1984).
116. See id.
117. In this context, the assumption is made that "the right to choose" automatically
equals abortion, as few other choices are permissible within radical feminism in the context
of reproductive choice.
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VI. CASE LAW AND RELATED STATUTES
Planned Parenthood v. Casey' carries within its pages the
noble air of a direct and intentional commitment to the comprehen-
sive protection of women. At the same time, and somewhat more
importantly, the Justices make clear their strong resolve to uphold
the protected liberty interest of abortion, stating "[w]e affirm the
central holding of Roe." 9
Notwithstanding the fact that the abortion cases, by default,
are in much disarray, the ruling in Casey now operates as the best
current law on abortion. 2 ' Since the Casey decision, abortion
continues to be a protected liberty, judiciously designed to safe-
guard and preserve the liberty interests of all women.
The case was brought to test the frontiers of states' rights, as
a challenge to Pennsylvania's abortion-limiting legislation.' 2' The
Supreme Court, in seeking to delicately balance the undue burden
of obtaining an abortion, against the substantial obstacles that
those limits might create, sculpted the monolith of Casey.'22 The
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act took measures, within the
state's power, to regulate abortion.' The law specifically prohibits
abortion for the purpose of sex selection'24 and requires that the
mother's physician determine that the abortion be "necessary."'25
The statute states "[n]o abortion which is sought solely because of
the sex of the unborn child shall be deemed a necessary abortion."'126
Illinois also has specific legislation prohibiting abortion for the
purposes of selection of sex."' In the context of a prohibition on the
abortion of a viable fetus, it extends this prohibition to sex-selective
118. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
119. Id. at 2794.
120. See id. The plurality opinion three years earlier in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), eviscerated Roe without explicitly overruling the landmark
case, giving states the right and authority to restrict abortion through state legislation. The
Casey decision effectively exonerated Webster, thus rendering Casey the current landmark
case on abortion. The decision in Casey blanketed and then recovered much of what Webster
abandoned of Roe. At least for the time being, Casey appears to be the law of the land on the
abortion right.
121. See generally 112 S. Ct. 2791.
122. Id.
123. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §3204(a) (West 1983).
124. See id. The American Civil Liberties Union chose not to challenge the sex selection
provisions of Pennsylvania's sex selection abortion law in its challenge via Casey to that law
that reached the Supreme Court.
125. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §3204(c).
126. Id. The sentence is actually the very last in that section of the statute. Taking the
appearance of a legislative afterthought, it clearly is an intentional one, nonetheless.
127. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 510/6 (West 1993).
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abortion performed "with the knowledge that the pregnant woman
is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the fetus.' 12
This statute, however, does not extend to sex selective abortions if
the fetus suffers from a genetic disorder linked to that sex.'29 Use
of the language "solely" could render this statute virtually useless,
because if the fetus is a female, and the mother's decision is to abort
for any other reason in addition to the gender of the fetus, applica-
tion of the statutory prohibition is avoided. The language "with the
knowledge" is equally problematic, as the woman's physician must
seek to know the interest of his patient to gain such knowledge.
This requirement is nonexistent in every abortion. Approximately
1.59 million abortions are performed each year in the United
States. 3 ° Of those, it is impossible to estimate how many are truly
performed for purposes of sex selection, as women never have to
disclose their reason for obtaining an abortion.' 3 '
Limiting sex-selection abortion furthers the interests of
protecting all women. Any such limitation cannot be promoted by
regulating a woman's intent, but good solutions would include
regulation of the abortion procedure to foster protection of women.
Women are capable, nonetheless, of making good decisions without
state regulation. Being so empowered would also release women
from any standard of constitutional analysis so thoroughly champi-
oned in Roe and Casey.
The "fundamental rights" language in Roe1" 2 appears to be
much stronger than the "undue burden" test in Casey,13 3 as clearly
the former is only overcome with a compelling state interest. There
is little to no discussion in Casey regarding the level of scrutiny
afforded the undue burden, but it is clear that if the burden is
indeed undue, the statute is struck down if it regulates pre-viability
abortion.1 4 There is no imposition of any standard of regulation on
post-viability fetal life.' 3' Furthermore, Casey provided that the
Constitution does not require states to permit abortion on demand.
States can forbid abortion after viability, provided maternal health
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. Abortions - Estimated Number, Rate, and Ratio, by Race: 1972 to 1988, in U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 83 (1993).
131. Regulation of a woman's reason to abort is therefore absurd. Instead, a woman needs
to be empowered within to choose otherwise, rendering virtuosity as the remaining solution.
132. 410 U.S. 113, 152-55 (1973).
133. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2820 (1992).
134. See generally 112 S. Ct. 2791.
135. Id.
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is an exception.' 36 Essentially, the trimester framework in Roe was
discarded for the undue burden framework of Casey. The substan-
tive due process analysis of Casey is reflective of the uniqueness of
abortion. Even so, applying that new and more utilitarian frame-
work to sex selection abortion, the state has a compelling interest
in protecting female fetuses from termination because of their gen-
der due to the state's interest in ending gender discrimination. 137
Where do we draw the line on state intervention? More
importantly, can morality be separated from liberty? It cannot. We
speak of fundamental rights without even a hint of the founding
concept of inalienable rights. The thrust of Casey was to limit
abortion to protect women, yet a number of questions remain. Did
that protection include all women, including those women yet to be,
or just those who are pregnant? Is there a possibility that we may
choose to protect those women who are able to voice their choice, as
well as those are not?
VII. REGULATION OF ABORTION PROVIDERS:
GENDER PROTECTION AND ALTRUISM
The Pennsylvania Act contains provisions which impose
reporting requirements on abortion clinics and other facilities that
provide abortion services.131 "[S]tate regulations on abortion which
are not deemed unduly burdensome, but which, nevertheless,
hinder or otherwise affect a woman's decision to obtain an abortion
of a nonviable fetus, are constitutionally enforceable."'139 The
passage and enforcement of record keeping requirements on
abortion providers is designed to protect women - all women. This
category would particularly include the pregnant woman, as well as
the viable female fetus, as the law in this area clearly upholds the
interests of a viable fetus.140
136. Id. Grateful appreciation is acknowledged for the assistance of Laura Hernandez,
attorney at the American Center for Law and Justice, who diligently worked through the
mire of the Casey analysis with me.
137. Without this analysis, a state interest in preventing the repression of women or in
treating men and women equally may not be specific enough to satisfy the compelling
interest standard for overriding fundamental rights.
138. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3207(b), 3214(a), 3214(). These provisions were also
subject matter in Casey, and were upheld by the Supreme Court in that decision. See 112
S. Ct. at 2833-2843.
139. Rebecca A. Cerny, Comment, United States Supreme Court Upholds Right to Abortion
Subject to Increased State Regulation, 25 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 212 (1992) (analyzing the
Casey opinion).
140. This is clearly the case in Roe's trimester analysis, and has been upheld since that
time in cases that followed.
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The final inquiry in Casey involved the constitutionality and
validity of the Act's reporting and record-keeping requirements.
Therein, the Supreme Court upheld its ruling in Planned Parent-
hood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,14 1 that "record keeping and
reporting provisions reasonably related to preserving a patient's
maternal health and confidentiality are permissible.' 4' The Court's
final ruling was that such provisions are indeed constitutional. 141
I submit that their constitutionality is not the supreme issue
in this matter. It is unfathomable that any person would allow
medical surgery to be performed on their body without desiring that
the doctor, facility, service and provider be subject to oversight and
review, beyond any potential claims the patient might be capable of
bringing in a malpractice action. 44  Despite Casey and other
decisions upholding regulation of abortion facilities, the laxity with
which these standards are enforced can only be explained by
political pressure on regulatory agencies and the cry of reproductive
freedom from women's rights activists. This should be unacceptable
to any reasonable woman.
Catharine MacKinnon declares that abortion is "inextricable
from sexuality."'45 She reasons that if this premise is not true, the
genders are unequal in their power over their own bodies, and more
importantly, over their own reproduction. 146 MacKinnon further
states that abortion is another way for men to control society and
sexuality, cloaking that control in a woman's right to privacy.
147
While disagreeing with her theories on sexuality, the latter could
not be more accurate. Abortion coerces women to handle crises that
they did not create alone. Yet the men, who are at least equally
141. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
142. Cerny, supra note 139, at 212 (discussing the implications of Casey and Danforth).
The only record keeping requirement that was not constitutional was spousal notification.
See 112 S. Ct. 2791. This is a fascinating area to which I hope to devote more attention in
future work.
143. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2797.
144. The area of abortion malpractice is a sleeping giant in personal injury litigation. The
most difficult aspect of such a practice is connecting injured parties with trained attorneys,
due to the stigma and emotional trauma of abortion and abortion related injuries. See
generally CRUTCHER, supra note 54. The physician's duty to protect women's health is the
focus of abortion malpractice, and unfortunately, that issue is beyond the scope of this article.
It is worth noting, however, that "[slince American abortion clinics are almost entirely self-
regulated, malpractice litigation becomes the only way of ensuring that legal abortions are
indeed safe abortions for the women who have them." REARDON, supra note 54, at 1. The
liberty interest that a woman may have in abortion is still subordinated to the woman
herself.
145. MACKINNON, supra note 44, at 93 (1987).
146. See id.
147. See id. at 95.
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responsible for the crisis, are relieved of any concern, torment,
anguish or responsibility by a woman's choice of abortion. Indeed,
the ultimate irony of abortion is that it inherently lets men off the
hook.
In June, 1997, the United States Supreme Court upheld a
Montana law prohibiting the performance of abortions by physician
assistants.'48 Using an undue burden analysis, the Court reasoned
that the burden that such a prohibition might place on a woman's
right to abortion was not formidable enough, particularly in light of
the value of medical attention afforded to women by the
legislation.'49 Nonetheless, abortion advocates said this was an
onerous ruling for women.5 ° Janet Benshoof of the Center for
Reproductive Law and Policy said the ruling was a "devastating
acceptance of discrimination against abortion providers."'' It is
discouraging to note that her concern was not for women, but for
abortion providers. One wonders which is more self-serving.
On the contrary, abortion providers seem quite adverse to
record keeping requirements, and regulation of the industry in
general, regardless of the health of women. Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services (HRS) of Florida has been notoriously unaggressive in
enforcing existing regulations on abortion providers, and HRS
enforcement efforts have not been taken very seriously.'52
One abortion clinic remained open for more than two and a half
years without a license, despite warnings from HRS to cease
operating .... Lack of paper work in files indicated that some
clinics may not have been inspected at all in some years, the
reports show, and when HRS did inspections and found prob-
lems, there were no follow-up surveys to see if the deficiencies
were corrected.'53
Florida has considered recommendations of legislation for minimum
sanitation and public health standards for abortion clinics to
remedy the problem,' but none is forthcoming even now, nearly a
decade later. The Ohio Health Department has likewise been found
148. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 117 S. Ct. 1865 (1997).
149. See id. at 1867.
150. See Supreme Court Allows Montana to Ban Abortions by Assistants, VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
June 17, 1997, at A3.
151. See id.
152. Diane Rado, Enforcement of Abortion Rules Is Lax, Records Show, ST. PETERSBURG
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keeping "poor records" on abortion.'55 Cincinnati Planned Parent-
hood seemed to be the worst offender, with reports submitted that
were not signed by a physician, that failed to indicate methods,
procedures, and that lacked health and demographic data on the
women who underwent abortions.'56
Indeed, abortion doctors and clinics have habitually rebelled
against regulatory standards of the industry.15' Women must be
concerned that if abortion is truly in the best interest of women:
born, unborn, aborted, and unaborted: we must at least begin to
ponder and discern the backlash. Is abortion "pro-women," or are
women, born and unborn, merely sources of revenue and subjects
of the abortion industry's use?
VIII. CONCLUSION
The conscience of American women is at stake. "Reading the
familiar words of the Declaration of Independence is thus a rather
sobering experience."'58 How shallow can our source of freedom and
liberty be? "We hold these truths to be self-evident."'59
Clearly, this great Declaration is indeed a charter for liberty but
it is also a statement of the authority on which our claim to
freedom and dignity rests. I believe that the smallest child
among us could understand the consequence of ignoring this
truth. If this authority is the ground on which we stand, if this
authority is that which established our freedom and gives it a
firm foundation, then if you use your freedom such a way as to
contravene and deny that authority, do you not cut the ground
out from under your claim to rights, to freedom, to dignity?6 °
Naomi Wolf honestly remarked, "I could no longer tolerate the
fetus-is-nothing paradigm of the pro-choice movement."'' She
admonishes the abortion rights movement to face the truth, or
155. Ohio: Health Officials Blasted for Abortion Record-Keeping, in AMERICAN POLITICAL
NETWORK ABORTION REPORT, Mar. 9, 1994.
156. See id.
157. See generally Karen M. Magnuson, High Court: Abortion Doctor Must Give Up
Records, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Jan. 21, 1982 (describing incident of doctors claiming
"physician-patient privilege," while undergoing state grand jury investigation).
158. ALAN KEYES, OUR CHARACTER, OUR FUTURE 130 (1996).
159. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
160. KEYES, supra note 158, at 131. Although the chapter in Keyes' book is about the
"spiritual healing" of America, it is completely appropriate in this context as well.
161. Naomi Wolf, Our Bodies, Our Souls: Rethinking Pro-Choice Rhetoric, NEW REPUBLIC,
Oct. 16, 1995, at 33-34. She states that she was several months pregnant, and "sick as a dog'
at the time.
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consequently, live at the height of hypocrisy. 162  In her opinion,
denying the truth is only hurting the abortion movement and the
women it seeks to empower, or more often, as this article points out,
exploit.
Yet the reality of American life, according to April Cherry, is
that women are controlled by outside forces. In an unconsciously
patronizing fashion, she states,
[w]omen do not have control of the technology, and because
women lack real social, political or economic power, sex-selec-
tive technologies, including abortion, are being used to annihi-
late women before they are born. Women are therefore being
required to participate in their own pre-victimization through
the use of sex-selective techniques which ensure the birth of
male children. 6'
Although her stand against sex-selection abortion is greatly
appreciated, Cherry fails to see women as responsible and capable
moral agents, able to make their own decisions. The women who
do the choosing are responsible for the choices they make. The
"right to choose" goes beyond social construction and power, toward
a feminization of coercion if abortion is truly the only choice women
have. Cherry is more accurate when she states, "[fleminism must
consider whether the right to choose abortion, as it is currently
framed by liberalism, increases women's reproductive freedom or
increases the exploitation of women's reproductive capacities."'64
162. See id.
163. Cherry, supra note 1, at 166 (citing Janice Raymond, Introduction to THE CUSTOM-
MADE CHILD?: WOMEN-CENTERED PERSPECTIVES 177, 177 (Helen B. Holmes et al. eds., 1981)
(using the terminology of "pre-victimization)).
Given the full moral status of women, the physical and emotional nature of
pregnancy and childbirth, the ways in which a forced pregnancy is oppressive
to women, and of course, the historical and current oppression of women,
abortion and sex-selective abortion still raise equal protection issues, regardless
of the moral or legal status of the fetus."
Cherry, supra note 1, at 211. I have trouble with her use of the term "forced pregnancy."
Forced pregnancy would certainly be the appropriate term in situations of pregnancy
resulting from rape or incest. My concern, however, is that Cherry is assuming women have
the inability to make the responsible decision to engage in self-control, birth control or
pregnancy and family planning before conception. Or, are women absolved from such
responsibility? I would like to give women a little more credit than to state that every
pregnancy is a "forced pregnancy."
164. Id. at 217. There is a dual exploitation of women's reproductive capacities. The first
is the reproductive exploitation of the mother, and the second is the reproductive exploitation
of the female fetus, as fetal tissue research allows the use of the unborn woman's womb and
ovum, as well as any other part of the tiny female body, by the consent of another woman,
her mother.
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Arguments that sex selection will lead to a better quality of life
for families, children, or women are comprehensible only in the
context of a sexist society that gives preferential treatment to
one sex, usually the male. Instead of selecting sex, it should be
possible to improve quality of life by making society less
sexist. '6
True quality of life cannot be fixed by the bandage of abortion of
female fetuses. The mere suggestion that it can evidences inherent
sexism, i.e., fewer women will improve everyone's quality of life.
Some consider abortion a problem rather than a solution, which
ought to suggest that the solution is indeed part of the problem.
Although sex selection could prevent some abuse of unwanted
female children and their mothers in the short run, it does not
correct the underlying abuses, namely the social devaluation of
women in many parts of Asia and the gender stereotyping of
children of both sexes in the rest of the world. 166
Furthermore, male superiority in developing nations will decrease
with the lesser reliance on an agrarian society. To some extent, and
possibly to a large extent, educational opportunities open to women
will increase opportunities for their functional value, worth, and
employability of women. Sex selection, even to obtain the "balanced
family" only helps to perpetuate gender stereotyping and sexism.'67
Stereotyping is no longer necessary in a post-modern society.
Women as well as men can carry on the family name, they can
inherit estates, they can do most jobs, and do them quite well.'68
Tasks that usually fall on women, like caregiving in particular, can
be done by men, unless women refuse to allow men to do them.'69
Furthermore, parent's natural desires to spend time with a child of
the same sex as themselves, whether it be to participate together in
anything from sports to shopping, can be done with either sex to an
.equal degree. 70 Women who use such excuses to choose one sex
165. Wertz, supra note 12, at 1433.
166. Id.
167. See CHRISTINE OVERALL, ETHICS AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS
17-39 (1987).
168. See MICHAEL D. BAYLES, REPRODUCTIVE ETHICS 35 (1984).
169. This type of refusal seems illogical and unwise. The goal of removing men from
performing certain acts of caregiving may be motivated by a warped sense of pride, or some
desire to maintain power.
170. Mary A. Warren brings this point up as the strongest argument for sex selection,
supra note 9, at 84-85, but Wertz, supra note 12, at 1434, does an excellent job diffusing any
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over another, especially boys over girls, are defrauding any integrity
that the women's movement might have ever had.
The choice to avoid sex selection abortion ought not be viewed
as a limit on autonomy - such a fallacy holds no reason. It ought
to be viewed as an opportunity for women to ensure that social con-
trol over reproduction is largely exercised by women and influenced
by the choices they make. 'The broader dispute over abortion is
manifested by a division in feminist theory over whether 'women
can []ever achieve the fulfillment of feminist goals in a society per-
missive toward abortion."' 1"
The abortion inquiry has become "a debate about women's
contrasting obligations to themselves and others," '172 namely each
other, as members of a gender class. The choice of sex selection
abortion is merely evidence of that equivocation. Women need not
continue to allow liberty to be a self-contradiction. If reproductive
liberty is properly put in a context of gender discrimination, then
that liberty is preserved by empowered self-restraint and personal
order on the part of all the individual members of that gender.
Women have much more than reproductive power; moreover, we
have the power to preserve liberty for all women with goodness,
justice and virtue.
There is no consensus regarding abortion within feminist
theory and rationale, nor does one exist among women in general.
Feminists themselves have expressed in their writings the ways in
which they have been hurt by abortion.173 Laws will not necessarily
such contention.
There are additional arguments against sex selection if it takes place after
conception. Prenatal diagnosis for this purpose is a misuse of a costly, and in
some nations scarce, medical resource. Sex selection negates the medical uses
of prenatal diagnosis to detect serious disorders in the fetus and undermines
the primary moral reason that justifies prenatal diagnosis and selective
abortion - the prevention of serious and untreatable genetic disease. Using
prenatal diagnosis to select sex could lead to a slippery slope toward selection
on cosmetic grounds, such as height, weight, or eye, hair, or skin color. If it
ever becomes technically possible to predict such characteristics, some parents
would select for such purposes, especially for weight.
Id. at 1434-35 (citing Dorothy C. Wertz et al, Attitudes Toward Abortion Among Parents of
Children with Cystic Fibrosis, 81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 992, 994 (1991)).
171. Sidney Callahan, Abortion and the Sexual Agenda, COMMONWEAL 232, 232 (Apr. 25,
1986), cited in Amicus Brief of Feminists for Life, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,
506 U.S. 263 (1991) (No. 90-985).
172. LUKER, supra note 115, at 193.
173. See generally LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVEs: THE POLITICS AND
HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE, BOSTON 1880-1960, at 45 (1988) (noting that in the mid- 1800's,
abortion was "becoming a common form of birth control among married women"); Priscilla
Alexander, Why This Book?, in SEX WORK (Francine Delacoste & Priscilla Alexander eds.,
1987) (relating how and why she became involved in prostitutes' rights); Marie Ashe, Law-
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amend these wrongs, though they may provide some relief.
Ultimately, the hearts and minds of women must be healed of the
scars of gender discrimination promoted by sex selection abortion
and attributable to the abortion preference itself. What was once
hailed as the "choice" of individual liberty that would free all
women has enslaved those seeking freedom at its borders, bringing
to an ironic reality the paradox of the skeptics.
Language of Maternity: Discourse Holding Nature in Contempt, 22 NEW ENG. L. REV. 521
(1988) (examining both medical and "mother" discourses on pregnancy and childbirth and
how they relate to the public policy debate on surrogacy); Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and
the Seam-less Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction" and the Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 355 (1989)
(describing the author's experiences in pregnancy, childbirth, and abortion); and ANDREA
DWORKIN, Whores, in PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 203 (1981) (discussing
pornography as men's depiction of women as whores).
